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validity in the light of the plain wording of the statute prescribing the applicable limitations affecting the venue question. While there is language in some of the earlier cases
tending to support the defendants' position (e.g. Sullivan v.
Lusk, 7 Cal.App. 186, 189-190 [94 P. 91, 92]), the effect of
joinder in the venue motion or consent to the change was not
a point in issue, and such language must be disapproved
as constituting an incorrect statement of the law under the
applicable statute. (Code Civ. Proc., § 395; see Aisbett v.
Paradise Mo1tntain Mining & Milling Co., supra, 21 Cal.App.
267, 269-270; White v. Anderson, 50 Cal.App.2d 634, 636
[123 P.2d 543] .) Rather here as in other cases in which
venue depends upon the residence of a defendant, the general
rule prevails in determining the "proper county for the trial
of the action'' and the consent of the resident defendant to
the proposed transfer cannot deprive the plaintiffs of their
right to have the action tried in the county of the consenting
defendant's residence. (Independent Iron Works v. American
President Lines, supra, 35 Cal.2d 858, 860.)
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Traynor,
J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
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THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FREDERICK LEO NYE,
Appellant.
[1] Rape-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Intent.-The
crime of assault with intent to commit rape was committed if,
when he made the assault, defendant intended to have sexual
intercourse with his victim and to use force to overcome her
resistance.
[2] !d.-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Intent.-When a
strange man enters a woman's bedroom, covers her mouth with
his hand, grasps her wrist while she screams and kicks, releases
her when she bites his hand, and makes no effort to take any
[1] See 22 Cal.Jur. 368; 44 Am.Jur. 917.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Rape, § 11(2); [3] Criminal Law,
§394; [4] Rape, §63(1); [5] Criminal Law, §277; [6] Criminal Law, §143; [7] Rape, §SO; [8] Rape, §63(2); [9] Rape,
§96(6).
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property, it is reasonable to infer that he intended to commit
rape, particularly when such an intent is shown by his attempt
to rape another woman under similar circumstances.
Criminal Law-Evidence-Other Crimes-Sexual Offenses.Evidence of an attempt to rape one woman is admissible to
show that defendant's acts against another woman under similar circumstances were committed with intent to commit rape.
Rape-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Evidence.-Defend-ant's admission to police officers that "he intended to have
sexual intercourse" with a prosecuting witness may not be
interpreted as merely showing that he intended peacefully to
solicit sexual relations, and a conviction of assault with intent
to commit rape on her is supported by evidence that, on entering her bedroom, he used such force as placing his hand over
her mouth and grasping her wrist, and by the fact that he had
never seen her before.
Criminal Law-Rebuttal Evidence.-Where defendant denied
making any admissions to police officers that "he intended to
have sexual intercourse" with a prosecuting witness, as testified
to by one of the officers, and offered evidence of an alibi, it is
proper, on rebuttal, to allow the other officer to testify regarding defendant's admissions, and to permit a woman, who lived
in the motel of the prosecutrix' residence, to testify that, on
two separate occasions, defendant entered her bedroom within
a few minutes of the time the alleged assaults were committed.
(Pen. Code, § 1093.)
!d.-Former Jeopardy-Identity of Offenses.-Dismissal of a
count charging attempted rape is not tantamount to an acquittal under a count charging assault with intent to commit
rape, whether or not the two counts charge different statements
of the same offense or two offenses of the same class of offenses.
(Pen. Code, § 954.)
Rape-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Cautionary Instructions.-Even if a cautionary instruction is not requested
by defendant in a prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape, it is incumbent on the court to give such an instruction on its own motion whether the alleged victim is a child
or a mature person.
!d.-Assault With Intent to Commit Rape-Evidence.-A conviction of assault with intent to commit rape is permitted on
the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness.

[3] Admissibility, in prosecution for sexual offense, of evidence
of other similar offense, note, 167 A.L.R. 565. See, also, 8 Cal.Jur.
74; 20 Am.Jur. 297.
[5] See 8 Cal.Jur. 236.
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[9] !d.-Appeal-Harmless Error-Instructions.-Failure to give
a cautionary instruction in a prosecution for assaults to commit rape is not prejudicial and a judgment of conviction will
not be reversed where, in view of the evidence as to defendant's admissions and the testimony of a third woman making
plausible the testimony of the two prosecuting witnesses, it is
improbable that the jury would have rejected the testimony
of the prosecuting witnesses had a cautionary instruction been
given.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County and from an order denying a new trial. Edwin L. Jefferson, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for assault with intent to commit rape. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Gladys Towles Root and Herbert Grossman for Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, and William E.
James, Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict finding him guilty on two counts of
assault with intent to commit rape and from the order denying
his motion for a new trial. The sentences for the two offenses
run concurrently.
The conviction on the first count is for an assault with
intent to commit rape on Miss W. on May 7, 1950, in Burbank.
Defendant entered Miss W. 's house-trailer early in the morning. ·when she awakened and asked what he wanted, defendant tore off the bed covers and ripped her nightgown down to
her knees. He grasped her throat and threatened to kill her
if she screamed. He exposed his genital organs, got on the
bed on top of Miss Vl. and attempted to accomplish sexual
intercourse despite her resistance. In the course of the attack
Miss W. 's alarm clock rang, and as defendant reached to turn
it off he released his grasp of her throat. He then left, after
threatening Miss W. with death if she reported the attack.
Defendant does not contend that the evidence was insufficient
to support his conviction on this count.
The conviction on the second count was for an assault with
intent to commit rape on Mrs. P., on May 27, 1950 in a motel
in Burbank. Defendant entered Mrs. P.'s bedroom early in
the morning. She awakened as he was closing the door. When
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she asked what he wanted, he came to her bed, placed his hand
over her mouth and grasped her wrist. She screamed and
kicked, and when she bit his hand he fled from the room.
He did not expose himself or get on the bed with her and
made no attempt to take any property.
Miss W. and Mrs. P. identified defendant as their assailant.
'rwo police officers testified that defendant had admitted that
he attacked the two women and that his purpose in entering
the motel was to have sexual intercourse with Mrs. P. Miss F.,
a resident of the motel, testified that on May 27th, the day of
the assault on Mrs. P., defendant opened the door to Miss F.'s
room about 7 :30 in the morning, looked in, and closed the
door. Miss F. also testified that on May 7th, the day of the
assault on Miss W., defendant entered Miss F.'s room, stood
by the bed, and left when he saw that she had awakened.
Defendant denied having seen either of the prosecuting
witnesses before the trial and introduced evidence of an alibi.
The jury rejected his defense and found him guilty on both
counts.
Defendant contends that testimony regarding his admission
that he intended to have sexual intercourse with Mrs. P. was
improperly admitted, on the ground that the People did not
first establish that the crime had been committed, and that,
even with his admission, the evidence is insufficient to support
the conviction on that count.
[1] The crime of assault with intent to commit rape was
committed, if defendant intended to have sexual intercourse
with his victim and to use force to overcome her resistance.
(People v. Ltttes, 79 Cal.App.2d 233 [179 P.2d 815]; People
v. Harshaw, 71 Cal.App.2d 146, 149 [161 P.2d 978] .) Defendant concedes that an assault on Mrs. P. was shown by the
evidence, but contends that his conduct, standing alone, does
not show the intent with which he made the assault.
[2] When a strange man enters a woman's bedroom,
covers her mouth with his hand, grasps her wrist while she
screams and kicks, releases her when she bites his hand, and
makes no effort to take any property, it is reasonable to infer
that he intended to commit rape, particularly when such an
intent is shown by his attempt to rape another woman under
similar circumstances. [3] The evidence of the attempt. to
rape Miss W. was clearly admissible to show that defendant's
acts against Mrs. P. were committed with the intent to commit
rape .. ''In such cases, former acts of the same kind are relevant to negative the' intent . as being of any other kind than to
•\

.'
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commit rape. Where the charge is of assault with intent,
the propriety of such evidence cmmot be doubted.'' ( 2 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d ed., § 357; People v. W estek, 31 Cal.2d 469,
480 [190 P.2d 9]; People v. Coltrin, 5 Cal.2d 649 [55 P.2d
1161]; see People v. Clapp, 67 Cal.App.2d 197 [153 P.2d 758];
People v. Cosby, 137 Cal.App. 332 [31 P.2d 218]; 1 Wharton,
Evidence in Criminal Cases, § 252, 167 A.L.R. 565, 600.)
[4] Defendant contends that the admission that "he intended to have sexual intercourse" with Mrs. P. went no
farther than to show that he intended peacefully to solicit
sexual relations. In the light of the evidence of the force
used and the fact that defendant had never seen Mrs. P. before,
the jury could reasonably reject that interpretation of his
admission. vVith the evidence of the admission properly
before the jury, any doubts as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the conviction for assault with intent to
commit rape are resolved. (See People v. Mm:chtry, 37 Cal.2d
385 [231 P.2d 847] ; People v. Bradley, 71 Cal.App.2d 114
[162 P.2d 38] ; People v. Finkel, 70 Cal.App.2d 508 [161 P.2d
298]; People v. Cosby, 137 Cal.App. 332 [31 P.2d 218].)
The present case is clearly distinguishable from the principal case relied on by defendant, People v. Fleming, 94 Cal.
308 [29 P. 647]. There, the prosecutrix was a servant girl
employed by the defendant. He entered her bedroom late at
night and, after promises, persuasions, and arguments, left
her room. The court properly stated: "It can hardly be
said that the defendant used force to any degree, and from
all circumstances of the affair, it would appear that physical
violence was not an element in his mind in attempting to
carry out his intentions. There was no duress upon the part
of the prosecutrix, no fear of personal violence, for there were
no threats of violence." ( 94 Cal. at 312.) Similarly, in
People v. Mullen, 45 Cal.App.2d 297 [114 P.2d 11], the defendant ardently forced unwelcome attentions on the prosecutrix, but did not threaten violence, and ceased his efforts and
allowed the girl to walk away after she resisted him. In neither
the Fleming nor the Mullen case did the prosecution offer
evidence of other similar conduct that showed defendant's
intent to commit rape.
Defendant next contends that the court improperly admitted rebuttal testimony over his objections. In the prosecution's case in chief, Officer Brennan testified regarding defendant's admissions. The two prosecuting witnesses testified
regarding defendant's conduct in their bedrooms. Defendant
then testified in his own behalf and offered evidence of an
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alibi, claiming that he had never seen the two women before
the preliminary examination. He admitted that he had been
arrested by Officers Brennan and Loranger, but denied making
any admissions.
On rebuttal, Officer Loranger testified regarding defendant's admissions and Miss F. testified that the defendant had
entered her bedroom on May 7th and May 27th, the dates of
the two assaults.
Defendant relies on People v. Rodriguez, 58 CaLApp.2d
415 [136 P.2d 626], where the People withheld the confession
during the case in chief, and offered it for the first time in
rebuttal without proof that it was voluntarily made. [5] In
the present case, the People did not withhold a material part
of the case until rebuttal, but offered rebuttal testimony to
support their case in chief after it had been controverted by
the defendant. The evidence was properly admitted. (Pen.
Code, § 1093; People v. Moore, 81 Cal.App.2d 799 [185 P.2d
32] ; People v. Gerbel, 71 Cal.App.2d 325 [162 P.2d 946] ;
see People v. Avery, 35 Cal.2d 487, 491 [218 P.2d 527];
8 Cal.Jur. 236.)
Defendant was charged in Count II of the information
with the crime of attempted rape on Mrs. P. and in Count IV
with the crime of assault with intent to commit rape on her.
After evidence was introduced and defendant was in jeopardy, the court dismissed Count II on motion of the district
attorney. Defendant was convicted on Count IV. He now
contends that the di~missal of Count II was tantamount to
an acquittal on Count IV, on the ground that an assault with
intent to commit rape is simply an attempt to commit rape.
[6] An indictment or information may charge ''different
statements of the same offense or two or more different offenses
of the same class of crimes or offenses, under separate counts''
and a verdict of acquittal on one count is not an acquittal on
any other count. (Pen. Code, § 954.) Thus, whether or not
Counts II and IV charged different statements of the same
offense or two offenses of the same class of offenses, the dismissal of Count II was not tantamount to an acquittal on
Count IV. (People v. Godina, 30 Cal.2d 356, 360 [181 P.2d
881].)
Defendant contends finally that the trial court erred in not
giving a cautionary instruction to the effect that since charges
of sex offenses are easy to make and difficult to disprove, the
testimony of the prosecuting witnesses should be examined
with caution.
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[7] Even if a cautionary instruction is not requested by
the defendant, it is incumbent upon the court in cases such
as this to give such an instruction on its own motion whether
the alleged victim is a child or a mature person. (People v.
Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885, 890 [129 P.2d 367]; People v. Lucas,
16 Cal.2d 178 [105 P.2d 102, 130 A.L.R. 1485] .) Rape is
''an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and
harder to be defended by the party accused, though never so
innocent." (Sir Matthew Hale, 1 Pleas of the Crown, 634.)
[8] A conviction is permitted on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecuting witness. Although protection of the
public makes it necessary to allow convictions on such testimony, since the offense is usually committed in secret, the
usual defense can only be a denial that the offense was committed by the defendant or in the case of forcible rape that
the prosecuting witness voluntarily consented to the sexual
act. Whether the prosecuting· witness is a child or a mature
person, the verdict will usually turn on whether the jury
believes the defendant's or the victim's version of the occurrence, and there is the same danger of misinterpreting the
defendant's acts as well as the danger of spite, blackmail,
vindictiveness, private vengeance, neurotic fabrication or
fanciful imagination.
The circumstances of each case determine whether failure
to give the instruction was prejudicial. In the cases in which
judgments were reversed for failure to give the instruction,
it was not improbable that the jury would have returned a
different verdict had the cautionary instruction been given.
In People v. Putnam, 20 Cal.2d 885 [129 P.2d 367], the evidence against the defendant consisted primarily of the testimony of a 12-year-old boy. The boy's testimony was inconsistent, and the acts of defendant were circumscribed. In
People v. Rankins, 66 Cal.App.2d 956 [153 P.2d 399], the
defendant was convicted of statutory rape and incest on the
uncorroborated testimony of his 16-year-old daughter. The
girl's testimony was inconsistent, and other evidence indicated that motives of spite might have led to her accusation.
In People v. Trumbo, 60 Cal.App.2d 681 [141 P.2d 225],
a conviction for lewd conduct with a child was based on inconsistent testimony of two young girls. The parents of the girls
corroborated their testimony, but the court held that under
all the circumstances failure to give a cautionary instruction
was reversible error. In People v. Williams, 55 Cal.App.2d
696 [131 P.2d 851], the prosecutrix was a mature woman, and
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the offense charged was forcible rape. Circumstantial evidence
indicated that the proseeutrix had consented to the intercourse,
and, again, refusal to give a cautionary instruction was held
to be prejudicial.
Under the circumstances of several other cases, failure to
give a cautionary instruction was not prejudicial. In People
v. Lucas, 16 Cal.2d 178 [105 P.2d 102, 130 A.L.R. 1485],
this court held that the trial court should have given the
instruction, but affirmed the judgment since the record elearly
pointed to the defendant's guilt. The same result has been
reached when there was evidence of corroborating facts and
circumstances, and the unequivocal nature of the defendant's
acts could leave no doubt as to his purpose. (People v. Owsley,
76 Cal.App.2d 166 [172 P.2d 561]; People v. Finkel, 70 Cal.
App.2d 508 [161 P.2d 298] ; People v. Meyers, 62 Cal.App.2d
24 [144 P.2d 60] ; People v. Fleming, 58 Cal.App.2d 37 [136
P.2d 88]; People v. M1trnrnert, 57 Cal.App.2d 849 [135 P.2d
665] .)
[9] In the present case, the evidence as to defendant's
admissions and the testimony of Miss F. lend plausibility to
the testimony of the two prosecuting witnesses. To acquit
defendant, the jury would have had to reject the testimony
of the women in its entirety, or reject their identifications
of defendant as the man who entered their bedrooms, or decide
that defendant had not intended to have sexual intercourse
with them by force. A careful examination of the entire
record in accord with article VI, section 4lh of the California
Constitution, leads us to the conclusion that it is improbable
that the jury would have rejected the testimony of the prosecuting witnesses had a cautionary instruction been given and
that there has therefore been no miscarriage of justice requiring reversal of the judgment.
The judgment and the order denying the motion for a new
trial are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and
Spence, J., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I do not feel that the evidence in support of the second
count (assault with intent to commit rape on Mrs. P.) was
sufficient to uphold the judgment of conviction. The inference that he had entered the room with intent to commit
larceny is as readily deducible from the evidence in support
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of this count, as is the inference that he intended peacefully
to solicit sexual relations with her. I£ the evidence as to the
assault on Miss W., 20 days prior to the act in question, had
not been admitted in support of the second count, no one
could doubt that the evidence would have been insufficient
~o uphold the judgment.
My views, with respect to the admission of evidence of
crimes other than that which is charged against the defendant
and for which he is being tried, have been expressed many
times (see dissent People v. Dabb, 32 Cal.2d 491, 501 [197
P.2d 1]; People v. Westek, 31 Cal.2d 469, 483 [190 P.2d 9];
People v. Peete, 28 Cal.2d 306, 322 [169 P.2d 924] ; People v.
Zatzke, 33 Cal.2d 480, 486 [202 P.2d 1009]) and, so long as
this court continues to sanction a procedure so manifestly
unjust, will be expressed many more times.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied December
10, 1951. Carter, J., was of the opinion that the petition
should be granted.

[L. A. No. 21772.

In Bank.

Nov. 16, 1951.]

Estate of WILLIAM TARRANT, Deceased. BEN H. BROWN,
as Public Administrator, etc., et al., Respondents, v.
GREAT NORTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al.,
Appellants.
[1] Charities-Attitude of Court.-Courts look with favor on all

attempted charitable donations, and will endeavor to carry
them into effect if it can be done consistently with the rules
of law.
[2] !d.-What Purposes are Charitable.-Provisions for the support, aid and help of tradesmen, handicraftsmen and "persons
decayed" are recognized as charitable in their design to accomplish objects which are beneficial to the community.
[3] Id.-Scope.-Scope of word "charity" changes and enlarges
with the needs of men and must advance with progress of
civilization so as to encompass varying wants of humanity
properly coming within its spirit.
[1] See 5 Cal.Jur. 18; 10 Am.Jur. 593.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Charities, § 4; [2, 3, 5, 7-9, 16]
Charities,§ 1; [6] Charities,§ 2; [10] Charities, § 32; [11] Wills,
§ 320; [12] Charities, § 37; [13-15] Charities, § 18; [17] Appeal
and Error, § 1273.

